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The Sign and
Its Alterity
Eugenia Paulicelli
In this essay I refer to the following works of Augusto Ponzio: Spostamenti:
Percorsie Discorsisul Segno, Bari: Adriatica, 1982; Lo Sprecodei Significanti:/'Eros,
la Morte, la Scrittura, Bari: Adriatica, 1983; Soggetto e Alteritii a Levinas, Bari:
Adriatica, 1983; Tra Linguaggioe Letteratura,Bari: Adriatica, 1983; Per Par/aredei
Segni/TalkingaboutSigns, Bari: Adriatica, 1985; Filosofiade/ Linguaggio,Bari: Adriatica,
1985; "On the Methodics of Common Speech," Differentia 1, 1986, pp . 136-66;
Interpretazionee Scrittura, Verona: Bertani, 1986; Rossi-Landie La Filosofiadel Linguaggio, Bari: Adriatica, 1988.

The notion of sign, particularly the "verbal sign," seems to
be a theoretical problem which leads to different tendencies in a
discipline such as semiotics. Signs are vehicles which establish
the relationship between man and the world, conceived not only
on a communicative level or by an exchange of data and meaning,
but as a continual process of semiotization or interpretation
(Peirce) as well. The interpretation intended as a methodsometimes
is revealed as an obstacle by the open process of interpretation
itself. The human subject is himself a texture of signs, through
which he interprets the world and renders the signs capable of
signifying, or comprehending,
the relationship between the
"knowing subject" and "different objects"-known
and unknown.
In Peircean terms, man is an open chain of signs and interpretants, or more precisely, man gives rise to thought. Thought itself
is a sign, and life itself is "a train of thought"; consequently, man
is a sign. Peirce establishes a very close link between language,
man and thought. Thus we can argue that there is a very strong
link between the concept of the human subject and that of the sign.
On the one hand we have a sign, which is conceived of as
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the identity or correspondence between what it "represents" and
the object itself (in a one-to-one relation). This is generally referred
to as the semiotics of Saussurean derivation, in which the sign is
composed of a signifie and a signifiant, and their relation is one of
"equal exchange." On the other hand, Peirce's semiotics of interpretation implies an open-ended chain of interpretants. The
dichotomy between signifier and signified is replaced by a relationship between object, sign and interpretant. From this concept of
sign there emerges, at the different stages of interpretation (Iconicity, Indexicality and Symbolicity) an elaborate conception of the
nature of hypothesis or" abduction," which gives further openness
to the act of interpretation.
These dynamic acts are not related to a mere process of decoding a message, because this method implies that a pre-established
reality or "apriori" data exist, and our role is relegated to discovering these presumed hidden data. This kind of discourse helps
to establish and maintain a certain law or rule for the social reproduction of a values system by a given society without discussing
them.
We must recall that Saussurean semiotics engenders certain
mechanical devices which do not overcome a restricted notion of
the sign and of the human subject. As Augusto Ponzio has argued
in several studies on Peirce, Bachtin, Vailati and Rossi-Landi,
those approaches cannot go beyond "decodification" and the reproduction of a pre-established symbolic universe. Furthermore,
the semiotics of the code excludes, or does not consider, those
aspects of the sign-such
as plurivocality and semantic ambiguity-which aim at recovering the conception of alterity, within
the constitution of the sign. This establishes an innovative aspect
of the sign because it actually modifies the very model of the sign
itself. Ponzio has stressed and analyzed this topic of the sign and
its alterity in various studies, which belong not only to the fields
of semiotics and philosophy of language, but to literary criticism
as well .
Ponzio' s work could be described as a crossroads between
two separate but interrelated routes. One belongs to the field of
philosophy of language, or more precisely of "languages" and
semiotics, and the other recovers "l' espace litteraire" as the text
par excellence,where the notion of alterity is highly represented.
These two trajectories establish a dynamic act which inscribes
itself into interpretive practice. A theoretical practice should enable
the subject-interpretant to evaluate a text from different perspectives. This is part of what Ponzio describes as "spostamenti." "Spos-
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tamenti" is in fact the title of one of Ponzio' s books, which suggests
the "displacement" of the self in the chain of semiosis from one
interpretant to another. This becomes evident in other studies on
the language of philosophy and in the book on Levinas.
In one of his more recent studies, Rossi-Landie la Filosofiadel
Linguaggio (1988), Ponzio appropriates Rossi-Landi's concept of
"extrasign residual"-a concept which relates to ideology and social reproduction, and which he brings to bear on the literary
field. He recognizes the letterarieta["literariness"] of a text, which
constitutes the residue of the ideological interpretation of the literary text. That is to say that the critical interpretation of ideology
does not fully explain or exhaust the letterarietaof particular texts.
Beyond this concept of letterarieta,what is crucial in Ponzio's
research is, first, the notion of the sign and its alterity, and second,
the pragmatic implications of that notion in the dynamics of interpretation. For Ponzio, the development of this line of research
is important in such authors as Peirce, Victoria Welby, Giovanni
Vailati, Bachtin and Levinas. Ponzio's studies demonstrate how
these authors place the conception of the sign within the context
of a dialogical relationship.
Beginning with his theoretical perspective and developing it
on the ground of semiosis, Ponzio has recently theorized what
he calls "ethosemiotics" (in Welby 1985):
With specific reference to this nonsectorial conception of signs as
inaugurated by Peirce, and by contrast with semiotics viewed solely
as a theory of knowledge, it has been suggested that we use the
term ethosemiotics. 1

"Ethosemiotics" represents expresses the combination of the study
of significance with its ethical and pragmatic implications. In addition to this, and on a broader level, we may say that ethosemiotics links dialogically two disciplines in a very subtle wayphilosophy of language and semiotics.
Despite their differences, there is a very close link between
Welby's signifies and Ponzio's "ethosemiotics." Victoria Welby
(1837-1912), in developing her theory of "signifies," was also concerned with terminological exactitude. Signifies is the term she
used in order to designate the connection between the notions of
sign, sense and meaning. "Signifies" is a theory of significance,
but also of "signifying," because it implies the mutable characteristic of the sign itself.
Such a framework, with its overt, interpretive practice, forms
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a theoretical grid for further studies, not only in the field of semiotics but in different realms of human thought. Literature, especially in its most innovative expressions, is certainly one of these.
But literature can also represent the site where words collide,
sometimes in what appears to be a random manner. If, echoing
Wittgenstein, our world is the language we speak-one which is
"a chaotic turmoil of events and accidents" -how can one sustain
an idea of a language that mirrors the world? Unless, as in literature and the arts, there is a word which expresses in its very
form this kind of discrepancy or "maladie" (e.g., Joyce, Kafka,
Calvino).
At this point a problematic question arises: Can a theory of
signs, with its overt and dynamical interpretation, fill the gap
between language and the interrelated forms of knowledge? More
precisely, I am referring to the fields of literature (and so to the
knowledgeof literature).
One of Ponzio' s responses to this theoretical "knot" is contained in Lo Spreco dei Signifcanti-l'Eros, la Marte, la Scrittura
(1983),2 and since then in further studies such as Tra Linguaggio
e Letteratura(1984) and Interpretazionee Scrittura; Scienza dei Segni
ed EccedenzaLetteraria (1986). One of the main objectives of the
first study is the absence of method, or of debate on that method,
and its implications for the constitution of the signified. He takes
up the notions of "depense" (Bataille) and the "excedent sense"
(Barthes) within the literary word, which convey a sort of primacy
of the signifier, or at least a primacy of the realm of "significance."
This perspective commits the critic in a way which is different
from a Peircean semiotics of interpretation. Ponzio, in fact, in
describing the semiotics of writing or "significance," considers
literature a "field" or a universe of discourse completely autonomous from other kinds of discourses.The conception of autonomy
is also used to overthrow the inner logic of the political discoursewhere the aim of language is to convince someone of something.
In letteraritethere is no end even when the language of everyday
speech is employed. The letteraritesometimes defines itself in the
lack of "meaning" or a precise end. The history of literature gives
us several exemplars of this perspective.
One of the projects developed in the critical discourse of Ponzio' s Lo Sprecodei Significantiwas the author's commitment to the
practice of "writing" (ecriture)aimed not only at clarifying or explaining the ambiguity of the analyzed texts, but also at establishing
a relationship of "alterity" with them.
What does the term "alterity" imply in this context? First, one
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must recognize that the "interpretant subject" is not a kind of
subject whose knowledge is situated beyond any given text.
Rather, that subject inscribes himself within the text even as he
differs from it. The former belongs to literature and the latter
belongs to the field of criticism. Traditionally, literary critics have
nevertheless restricted themselves to the understanding and systematization of texts which resist any tidy ordering principle (e.g.,
avant-garde texts).
At this point, another obstacle seems to appear on the interpretive scene . There is the danger of running two theoretical
risks. First, such textual disorder may not be possible to comprehend fully. As a result, one could impose a "grammar of disorder" on it. This, however, is a contradiction in terms because
it asserts a law of disorder. Second, if a "scientific" method (semiotics, etc.) requires a particular end, how can it be employed in
interpreting a literary text without lying to itself or allowing the
text to lie to itself? This seems to me an open question because
of the irreducible alterity of literature with regard to the so-called
exact science and rigorous sciences.
One of the problematic responses, which is not to be intended
as a "solution" to the question, is, as Ponzio shows, that to maintain the category of alterity within the sign is to ascribe the notion
of alterity to man himself (pacethe Peircean idea that "man is a
sign").
Ponzio in Rossi-Landie la FilosofiadelLinguaggiorecalls Umberto
Eco's observation (in "L'Ultima Soglia della Semiotica") that there
is always a close link between the conception of the sign and the
conception of the human subject. This very fragile and crucial
relationship is inevitable and its precise trace is in the very act of
writing [ecriture].It is an act which underscores the chaos, and in
which both the critic and the writer are involved. Yet both employ
languagein such different ways that they try to give shape to the
chaos of the world. Moreover, that very act of shaping expresses
this disorder or absence of form. As Calvino once said, the "lack
of substance is not to be found in images or in languages alone,
but in the world itself . " 3 The ongoing conflict for language is
whether the word can capture exactly what evades the language
itself and its rules. But this is a very old battle, and its solution
has yet to be discovered.
I think that the supremacy of signifiers in the use of the
discourse of literary criticism should not be maintained as the
only tool in reading a text. One must not conceive of alterity as
being external to the concept of sign and to the process of semiosis;
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it resides within the interpretive dynamics.
What is extremely important from a theoretical perspective,
and with regard to the question of method as well, is what Ponzio
has called the "self-sufficiency" [autosufficenza]of the abductive
interpretant. 4 It is exactly this connotation of Peircean semiotics
which presents a challenge and provocation to the fixed law of
identity. In doing so, one undermines the logic of binarism, or
dichotomy (true/false, identical/diverse), and recovers the notion
of alterity, which enables us to overcome and to shift the preexisting object of analysis.
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